The Bank-Detail Change: Finance's Most Important Routine Control
A supplier asking to update their bank details looks like admin. It is also the moment a payment can be redirected for good. The businesses that stay safe don't rely on spotting a convincing fake — they run a simple, verified process every time, and it works.
Somewhere in most finance inboxes this week, a supplier will write to say they have changed banks. It is one of the most ordinary requests in accounts payable — a new BSB, a new account number, a polite note to update the records before the next invoice.
It is also the single moment when a payment can be redirected for good. Payment re-direction was the second-largest scam type by reported loss in Australia in 2025, at $166.8 million [1]. Yet there is genuinely good news in the same data: combined reported scam losses are 29.7% below their 2022 peak [1]. Controls work. And the control that matters most here is not a piece of technology or a gift for spotting fakes. It is a short, verified process that runs the same way every time.
The core idea
A bank-detail change is not admin — it is a payment decision made in advance. The businesses that stay safe don't rely on judging whether a request looks genuine. They verify every change the same way, through a channel the requester didn't supply, with more than one person involved. That makes the right outcome the routine one.
Why this request is different from every other email
Most fraud tries to get you to pay something you shouldn't. A bank-detail change is quieter: it gets you to pay something you should — a real invoice, for real work, to a real supplier — into the wrong account. Nothing about the invoice looks wrong, because nothing about it is.
That is why the request deserves its own process. The ACCC notes that scammers either get into a business's email system or impersonate its address by changing as little as one letter, and can make invoices look legitimate by copying logos and ABNs [2]. The ACSC describes the same pattern: a compromised vendor email account sends genuine-looking invoices with edited bank details, and the customer pays, believing it is paying the vendor [6]. The same technique is used against payroll, with a request to change an employee's banking details [6].
$166.8m
reported lost to payment re-direction scams in Australia in 2025 — the second-largest scam type by loss
National Anti-Scam Centre (ACCC)15%
of cybercrime self-reported by businesses in FY2024–25 was email compromise fraud with a financial loss
Australian Signals Directorate — Australian Cyber Security Centre29.7%
fall in combined reported scam losses since the 2022 peak — prevention is working
National Anti-Scam Centre (ACCC)A routine request with a very large downside — and a clear trend in the right direction.
The trap: verifying inside the conversation
The most natural response to an unexpected change is to reply and ask. It feels responsible. It is also exactly what the fraud is designed for. If you reply to query the new payment details, the ACCC warns, the scammer will simply respond justifying the change [2]. A phone number in the email signature has the same problem: it belongs to whoever wrote the email.
Real verification happens outside the conversation that made the request. The guidance from regulators is consistent: call the business on a number you have found yourself [2], using contact details from their official website or your existing records [1]. It takes a few minutes. It is the most valuable few minutes in accounts payable.
See it for yourself
The example below is fictional, but every warning sign in it comes from Australian government guidance. Tap each highlighted part of the email to see why it matters — and notice that none of the flags, on its own, would prove the request is fake. That is the point: a good process doesn't depend on spotting them.
Spot the Warning Signs
Tap each highlighted part of this fictional email
Hi team,
Kind regards,
Dana Whitlock, Accounts
Harbourline Supply Co ·
Every highlighted part of the email hides a warning sign. Tap one to see why it matters.
Illustrative example. The business, people, address, phone number, and bank details are fictional.
Five controls for a verified change
A strong bank-detail process is short enough to run every time. It comes down to five controls, each with a clear owner.
Five Controls for a Verified Bank-Detail Change
Click each control to explore what a strong change process looks like
Every change to where money is sent — for a supplier or an employee — goes through one defined route, not whichever inbox it lands in. The request is logged before anything else happens, and nothing in the request itself (the email, the letterhead, the attached form) is treated as proof that it is genuine.
- •One intake route for all bank-detail changes, suppliers and staff alike
- •Every request is logged before it is actioned
- •Payroll bank changes follow the same process as supplier changes
- •Staff know that a change request is never “just admin”
- •Changes are actioned from whichever inbox receives them
- •Supplier records can be updated straight from an email
- •Employee bank changes are handled informally
- •Urgency in the request speeds the change up
Route every bank-detail change through one logged process — the request is the start of a check, never the evidence for it.
Verification happens outside the conversation that made the request. Call the supplier on a number already held in your records or found on their official website — never the number in the email, and never by replying to it. Ask them to confirm the change, rather than reading the new details out to them.
- •A call-back to independently sourced contact details, every time
- •The supplier confirms the change, not just a yes to your question
- •Who verified, when, and on which number is recorded
- •Verification is required even for long-standing suppliers
- •Verification is a reply to the same email thread
- •The number called comes from the request itself
- •Familiar suppliers are waved through without a call
- •Nobody can say afterwards how a change was confirmed
Verify by calling contact details you already hold — a reply to the email only ever reaches whoever sent it.
The person who receives a change request is not the person who verifies it, and neither of them alone can update the record and release the first payment. Separation means a busy afternoon, a convincing email, or pressure for secrecy can't route around the process — and gives staff a clear way to say “that's not how we do it”.
- •Request, verification, and approval sit with different people
- •Supplier-record changes need a second approver in the system
- •Staff have a clear route to report pressure to skip steps
- •Approvers can see the verification record before approving
- •One person can receive, change, and pay in a single sitting
- •Senior-sounding requests bypass the usual approvals
- •Second approval is a click with no record to look at
- •Requests for secrecy are quietly accommodated
Split the change across people, so the process holds even when one person is rushed, pressured, or convinced.
The first payment to new details is the one that matters most. Where your bank offers a name check — Confirmation of Payee or the name PayID displays — use it, and treat a mismatch as a stop. After the first payment, confirm with the supplier, on the verified contact, that it arrived.
- •The bank's name check is used wherever it is available
- •A name mismatch stops the payment until re-verified
- •Receipt of the first payment is confirmed with the supplier
- •Large first payments get an extra look before release
- •Name-check warnings are clicked through to keep payments moving
- •The first payment to new details is batched like any other
- •Nobody confirms the money arrived where it should
- •Problems surface only when the real supplier chases payment
Use the bank's name check as a stop, not a suggestion — and confirm the first payment landed before trusting the new details.
Every change leaves a record: who requested it, how it was verified, who approved it. Recent changes are reviewed regularly against that log. And the response to a suspected redirection is written down in advance — call the bank immediately, report it, and tell the genuine supplier — so nobody has to work it out under pressure.
- •A change log covering request, verification, and approval
- •Regular review of recent bank-detail changes
- •A written first-hour plan for a suspected redirection
- •Genuine suppliers are told when their identity has been used
- •Supplier records change with no history kept
- •Nobody reviews recent changes until something goes wrong
- •The response to a redirection is improvised
- •Delays in calling the bank while people debate what happened
Record every change and rehearse the response — a clean trail makes reviews easy and a fast call to the bank gives the best chance of recovery.
Tap the progress bar or cards above to move between the five controls
Two of these deserve a little more detail.
Separate the people, not just the steps. The ACSC recommends a clear and consistent business process for verifying requests for payment, plus a way for staff to report pressure for secrecy or requests to bypass protective processes [6]. In practice, that means the person who receives a change request is not the person who verifies it, and neither of them alone can release the first payment to the new account. When roles are separated, no single convincing email — or single busy afternoon — can move money.
Use the name check, but don't stop there. One of the most encouraging developments is happening at the banks. In 2022 the ACCC called for confirmation of payee in Australia, so that banks would automatically check whether an account name and number match [3]. That name-checking function has been rolling out to participating banks since July 2025, alongside the name display PayID already provides [4]. Where your bank offers it, make the check part of the process — and treat a mismatch as a stop. But it complements the call-back; it doesn't replace it.
A familiar example
Picture a construction subcontractor's accounts team on a Thursday afternoon. An email arrives from a regular materials supplier: they have moved banks, the next invoice is attached with the new details, and could payment please go out today to avoid a hold on the account. The logo is right. The ABN is right. The invoice matches a real delivery.
The accounts officer does what the process says. They log the request, and a colleague calls the supplier's accounts contact on the number already held in the supplier file — not the one in the email. The supplier has not changed banks. Their email account had been compromised, and the "urgent" invoice was a copy of a genuine one with the account number changed. Nobody had to be suspicious or clever. The process made the right outcome the default one — and the team let the supplier know their mailbox had been compromised, so their other customers could be warned too.
How strong is your bank-detail process?
The assessment below scores five dimensions of bank-detail change control and points to where to focus first.
Bank-Detail Control Assessment
Question 1 of 5
How do requests to change supplier or employee bank details reach your team?
If a payment does go to the wrong account
Even good processes are tested. If money or banking details have gone to a scammer, the ACSC's advice is to contact your bank immediately and report the cybercrime [6]. Speed matters, so make the first steps part of the written process — who calls the bank, who reports, and who tells the genuine supplier — rather than something to work out under pressure.
What to measure
A bank-detail process is easy to keep strong when it is visible. A few measures, reviewed monthly, are enough:
- Changes verified out-of-band — the share of bank-detail changes confirmed by a call to independently sourced contact details. The goal is 100%.
- Time to verify — how long a genuine change waits. Keeping this short keeps the process from being bypassed.
- Changes with two people involved — request, verification, and approval separated every time.
- Requests stopped — changes that failed verification. Every one is a payment that went to the right place.
- Supplier records reviewed — recent changes to bank details checked against the change log.
Final thoughts
The bank-detail change will never feel like a high-stakes moment. It arrives as a polite email, between invoices, on an ordinary day. That is exactly why it deserves a process rather than a judgement call.
The encouraging part is how achievable this is. A verification call, two sets of eyes, a name check where the bank offers one, and a clear record — none of it is expensive, and all of it is within a finance team's control. Businesses that make the verified change routine protect their own cash, protect their suppliers' cash, and spend far less time worrying about the next convincing email.
A note on the detail
This article is general information, not legal, financial, or security advice, and the figures above were current as at October 2026. If you think a payment has been redirected, contact your bank immediately, then report it through ReportCyber at cyber.gov.au and to Scamwatch.
The next time a supplier says they have changed banks, who in your team will verify it — and what number will they call?
Sources
- National Anti-Scam Centre (ACCC). Continued action critical to combat fraud as annual scam losses exceed $2 billion. 30 March 2026.Release of the Targeting Scams Report for calendar year 2025, combining data from Scamwatch, ReportCyber, AFCX, IDCARE and ASIC. Combined reported losses were $2.18 billion, up 7.8% on 2024 but 29.7% below the 2022 peak of $3.1 billion. The top five scam types by loss were investment ($837.7m), payment re-direction ($166.8m), romance ($139.9m), phishing ($97.6m) and remote access ($69.9m). Advises contacting the person or organisation directly using phone numbers or email addresses found on their official website or app.View source
- Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Beware of fake invoices from scammers impersonating businesses. 4 April 2024.Scammers either hack into a business's email system or impersonate its email address by changing as little as one letter, and can make invoices appear legitimate by copying logos and ABNs. If you reply to query the change to payment details, the scammer will respond justifying the change. The most commonly targeted industries are those that regularly deal with large transfers of money, such as real estate, legal and construction. Advises calling the business on a number you have found yourself to confirm payment details are correct.View source
- Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Payment redirection scams cost Australian businesses $227 million last year. 7 July 2022.Targeting Scams report for 2021: Australian businesses lost $227 million to payment redirection scams in 2021, a 77% increase on 2020, making payment redirection (business email compromise) the most financially damaging scam for Australian businesses that year. The ACCC called for confirmation of payee to be implemented in Australia, where banks automatically check whether account names and numbers match.View source
- Reserve Bank of Australia. Consumer Payment Behaviour in Australia (Bulletin). May 2026.PayID provides the recipient's name prior to payment, which can help reduce the risk of misdirected payments and fraud. A similar name-checking function has begun rolling out to participating banks from July 2025 through Confirmation of Payee for account-to-account transfers.View source
- Australian Signals Directorate — Australian Cyber Security Centre. Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024–2025. 2025.Business email compromise (BEC) fraud resulting in financial loss was 15% of self-reported cybercrime threats for business (small, medium and large) in FY2024–25. The average self-reported cost of cybercrime to small business was $56,571. Total financial losses from BEC for large business increased by 138%.View source
- Australian Signals Directorate — Australian Cyber Security Centre. Protecting against business email compromise. Last updated October 2021.Describes invoice fraud (a compromised vendor email account used to send legitimate-looking invoices with edited bank details) and employee impersonation, including requests to change a worker's banking details. Recommends a clear and consistent business process to verify and validate requests for payment, protecting the contact details of accounts, finance and HR teams, and a reporting process for pressure for secrecy or requests to circumvent protective business processes. Warning signs: an unexpected change of bank details; an urgent payment request or threats of serious consequences; unexpected payment requests from someone in a position of authority; an email address that doesn't look quite right. If money or banking details have been sent to a scammer, contact your bank immediately and report the cybercrime to ASD.View source
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